Introduction
As the U.S. transitioned to stability operations in Iraq, the mission dictated a focus on improving host nation security to allow the Iraqis to maintain internal order and regional peace after the U.S. departure. The major threat to security during this time was insurgent activity and sectarian violence. 1 Building the support of the local population through integration and counterinsurgency operations (COIN) was a critical component to improving the security situation in Iraq, and along with Host-Nation partnering it was used successfully in many parts of Iraq. 2 This paper will review lessons learned from the transition of Joint Base Balad to the Iraqi Air Force. Although the transition was successful and no lives were lost at Balad in the year leading up to the transition 3 , better utilization of host-nation partnering and COIN tactics would have significantly improved the potential for lasting regional and local security.
The ability to form strong host nation partnerships at Balad was handicapped by several factors. The U.S. had become intolerant of unnecessary casualties in Iraq resulting in a general aversion to risk and increased security concerns regarding Iraqis on Balad. Political uncertainty concerning the size, composition and mission of the military stay-behind force led to unfocused planning and lack of departure credibility. The Iraqi Air Force was not fully formed and the contingent stationed at Balad was not sufficient to assume control of such a large base. The lack of unity of command between the U.S. Air Force and Army resulted in fragmented unity of effort regarding employment of COIN tactics to improve the potential for long-term security in Iraq.
Some of these issues were political and could not have been influenced by the warfighter, however this paper will explain their effects on the base transition and explore what security benefits may have gained by employing host-nation contractors to conduct base operating support functions earlier in the transition. Employing host-nation contractors would have increased security risk from insider attacks, but would have enabled interaction with local nationals critical to establishing long-term relationships and lasting security. Other potential benefits include increased cooperation from the host nation by demonstrating the benefits of U.S.
occupation, decreased cost and increased opportunity to conduct population-centric counterinsurgency operations to improve short and long term security in this region.
A Joint Staff analysis of lessons from the past decade of operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan identified how failure to plan and resource strategic and operational transitions endangered accomplishment of the overall mission. 4 Many of the lessons learned in the withdrawal and security transition from Iraq will apply to the upcoming transition in Afghanistan. As in Iraq, there will be no military victory or surrender ceremony when we leave.
Whether our efforts in these wars were a success or failure will not be immediately known.
However, one initial measure of success will be how we leave. A responsible transition will provide the foundation for these countries to manage their own security, economic growth and political stability.
Transition of Joint Base Balad
Joint Base Balad was one of 341 U.S. bases to close or transition to the Government of Iraq between 2009 and 2011. 5 As the second largest base in Iraq and a logistical hub supplying all Northern Iraq, Balad was one of the last bases to transition. 6 At its peak, Balad housed over 35,000 personnel, and along with many other bases had been identified by the Government of Iraq as essential to Iraqi security. Prior to the war the base was known as al Bakr Air Base and upon our departure it was returned to the Iraqi Air Force. In absence the unity of command, USF-I oversaw the transition of Balad through weekly video-teleconferences and data collection. 9 The 332 AEW met all reporting and transition deadlines, however progress in getting more Iraqi military personnel to Balad to ensure a smooth transition was slow. Some friction also developed as the need to balance the USF-I requirements to keep the logistical hub operating to the last minute conflicted with Balad's requirement to drawdown personnel and equipment to meet transition timelines.
Without a full Iraqi unit to partner with at Balad, the 332 AEW faced some unique challenges. The U.S. had good intentions to turn over a completely functional air base to the Iraqi Air Force. However, the reality was Balad had much more infrastructure and technology than the Iraqi Government could sustain. The base infrastructure was similar to a small city with two power plants, two sewage treatment plants, two water purification plants, two runways and all the air traffic control equipment and facilities that go along with them, four municipal waste and one medical waste incinerators, multiple dining facilities/kitchens, a large hospital and over 7,000 other facilities all spread out over 6,400 acres. 10 When the Government of Iraq took ownership of Balad, it was evident there was no way the Iraqi Air Force contingent which numbered fewer than 100 men would be able to maintain and operate such a massive base. The smallest dining facility was extremely oversized for their population, the living quarters were inadequate for family living or Iraqi soldier living, the central power and sewer plants were beyond the technological capacity for the Iraqi Air Force contingent to sustain, and because of the USF-I mandate, no water purification systems could be left behind for Iraqi use. It is difficult to directly compare the costs for AFCAP to LN contracts due to the decreasing number of base personnel requiring support and the differences in the way the contracts were written. In all cases, the local national contracts were less expensive than the AFCAP contract and the contractors did not live on Balad, thus they did not require the same level of support (feeding, housing, etc.). One contract where direct comparisons can be drawn was the Incinerator/Solid Waste disposal contract. Although the number of personnel on Balad dramatically declined in the last two months, the amount of trash did not. Demobilizing units produced significantly more trash than steady state operations thus keeping the trash stream steady almost up until the last day. 14 The average AFCAP price per month for this service was $590K and the LN contract price per month was $334K. In all cases it was significantly cheaper to hire LNs to do this work. Unfortunately, the LN bridge contractor was technologically challenged to keep the incinerators running properly and due to the short terms of the contract was not motivated to invest in the expertise required. For these reasons, U.S. personnel were heavily tasked to assist the contractor in managing the large amounts of waste which continued to accumulate throughout the end of mission. Given a longer period of performance, the contractor would have been motivated and able to get skilled and trained incinerator operators.
The Iraqi companies who took over these responsibilities had significant difficulties at first due to the rapid handoff from AFCAP contractors and poor condition of the government equipment they were given to operate. The entire base experienced overnight mission Despite our best efforts to improve the Iraqi view of the coalition, much of the population still viewed it as an occupation force, and while there was a clear understanding at the governmental level that we intended to leave, there was apprehension at the local level that we were in Iraq to stay. We needed to demonstrate that we had a plan to leave.
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Our lack of clear departure credibility could have been partially to blame for the continued insurgent resistance. Research indicates an occupation is likely to generate less opposition when the occupying power makes a credible guarantee that it will withdraw and return control to an indigenous government in a timely manner. 17 David Edelstein studied historical examples of occupations and judged whether they failed or succeeded based on weighing the costs (in both duration and number of troops required) against whether or not the occupation accomplished what it was tasked to do. He found there were three significant predictors of successful occupations: the occupying country must overcome the perception that they are a military conqueror; convince the occupied population that the occupation will improve their lives; and assure them they will regain sovereignty relatively soon. 18 As described below, none of these factors were present at Balad.
In 2008 personnel did not believe we were really going to leave for most of 2011, the Iraqis probably did not believe we would leave either.
The Iraqis around Balad expressed their resistance in the form of insurgent activity and attacks on the base. Although the area surrounding Balad looked like a peaceful farming community from the air, over 275 rocket and mortar attacks were fired at Balad from JanuaryNovember 2011. These attacks had operational impacts such as damaging the airfield, facilities, and endangering personnel on the base. As we approached the transition there was a risk of more strategic impacts if the insurgents were able to make it appear their attacks were driving us out of Iraq. Additionally, Balad became more vulnerable to attack as sensors, defense equipment and emergency response personnel redeployed. For this reason our departure date was not releasable to anyone without a security clearance and a need to know.
Edelstein found one successful approach for establishing credibility was to make withdrawal contingent on behavior of the host country. This tactic was used during the Allied occupation of Italy. As Allies moved from South to North they gave increasing control of southern Italy back to local citizens. The conditions set by the Allies for returning control were cooperation in the defascistization of Italian society and the absence of resistance to advancing Allied troops. There were no deadlines set and the Allies proved their credibility by granting self-governance in response for cooperation. 19 Conditions-based transitions had been used successfully in Iraq when transferring security responsibility in each of the provinces. The 332 AEW goal was to get all people and equipment out safely and meet the basic USF-I requirements for base transition. 21 Strategic security goals were not paramount, so population-centric COIN principles like bringing on more LN contractors were not considered.
The U.S. chose not to employ a conditions-based withdrawal throughout Iraq to gain operational flexibility to stay if given the opportunity. Based on the continued IDF attacks up until the final days at Balad, one can assume the local Iraqis did not see any benefit to the U.S. occupation in that region.
Recommendation
Our efforts to transition Balad to the Iraqi Air Force would have been in vain if they were not able to maintain security of the base after our departure. In the absence of a more robust Iraqi Air Force unit to partner with, we could have improved the likelihood of enduring security by transitioning to local national contractors at least six months prior to our departure. This would have assisted the U.S. with a smoother transition, and enabled additional populationcentric COIN tactics to enhance long term security and partnership with the Iraqis. To ensure unity of effort throughout Iraq, such a transition plan could have been included as a requirement in the USF-I Base Transition Smart Book.
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By transitioning from U.S. to LN contracts six months prior to departure we could have reduced the number of redeploying personnel thereby increasing our operational flexibility to depart as soon as the conditions were right. The more people we had living on the base, the longer it took to depart. Only one unit on base was able to self-redeploy (drive-out); the remainder all needed to fly out which drove the requirement to keep the airfield running until the last day. Roughly one-quarter of the population on Balad six months prior to departure was contractors. These contractors also had facilities and equipment they had to transport off the base. Contractors who waited until the last 30 days to transport their equipment encountered rogue Iraqi Army blockades designed to confiscate equipment before it could be sold or sent out of the country. By moving their redeployment up to T-120 days these issues would have been lessened.
Another benefit of employing LN contractors would have been an expansion of population-centric COIN tactics to integrate civilian and military efforts. Increased interaction with local Iraqis would have enabled U.S. Forces to address the root cause of insurgent attacks against the base. The local population would have benefited economically and received job training in how to provide and maintain essential services. As the Iraqis realized the benefits of the U.S. presence, perhaps they would have been more apt to invite us to stay and continue our partnerships to improve security.
Although the main reason we did not employ more LN contractors was our aversion to the risk of insider attacks, another reason was we had grown accustomed to a level of service and reliability that the Iraqis were not able to provide. During indefinite operations this was understandable; however as the focus shifted from stabilization to transition we should have begun a gradual reduction in our expectations of service. By hiring LN contracts at least six months prior to the transition the quality of service would have been lower, but it would have been more in-line with what was sustainable after we departed. As indicated in the COIN manual, when the U.S. is supporting a host nation long-term success requires establishing viable host nation leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant U.S. support.
Conclusion
Three persistent problems that affected base transition efforts at Balad and throughout
Iraq were opposition to U.S. forces who were viewed as an occupying force, lack of solid partnership relationships with military units, and lack of credibility in the U.S. intent to depart and return control of the military bases to the government of Iraq. To overcome the perception of the U.S. as a military conqueror and convince the occupied population their lives would be improved by the occupation we must integrate better with the local nationals living near our large bases. One way to do this is to hire local nationals instead of third country nationals to provide essential services. While it may not be practical for long term or enduring operations, the benefits during transition outweigh the security risk. Hiring local contractors to perform this work will increase cooperation from the host nation by demonstrating the benefits of U.S.
presence, and provide additional opportunities for population-centric counter-insurgency operations.
